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RUSSIAN PHILORTHODOX RELIEF 
DURING THE GREEK 
WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 
by 
Theophilus Prousis 
University of North Florida 
THE GREEK WAR of Independence against the Ottoman Empire 
(1821-1830) constituted the first breach in the Metternichean system 
established at the Congress of Vienna, which sought to preserve the status 
quo and protect legitimate rulers against liberal and nationalist revolts. 
The Greek struggle was the major diplomatic issue confronting the great 
powers in the 1820s and became something of a cause celebre for European 
public opinion. 
During the course of the "Greek affair," philhellenism developed into 
an international movement. It expressed deep appreciation for the classical 
and Byzantine heritage and strong interest in the fate of the Greek nation 
struggling to reconstitute itself as an independent nation-state. Philhel-
lenes, be they in the West or in Russia, supported the Greek cause either 
through political, military, financial, and humanitarian assistance or 
through literary-artistic expression. After a brief introduction to the nature 
and chief characteristics of Russian philhellenism, this article will focus on 
one of its heretofore little known but vital manifestations - Russian 
humanitarian relief assistance. 1 
The topic of Western philhellenism has been extensively studied in 
numerous works. 2 One is surprised, however, that the Russian philhellenic 
movement has received but scant scholarly treatment. 3 This omission is 
striking given the fact that Russian philhellenism existed and indeed 
represented a unique phenomenon. It was only in Russia that a renewed 
interest in the classical world, which was prevalent in Western Phil hellenic 
circles, interacted with traditional religious and historical affinities with 
the Greek or Orthodox East - the lands and peoples which had formerly 
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been part of the Byzantine Empire. Russian response to the "Greek affair," 
therefore, while associated with the framework of European attitudes 
toward ancient Greece, was rendered distinct and unique because of Rus-
sia's Orthodox-Byzantine heritage. 
A common Orthodox tradition, in addition to promoting a sense of 
cultural cohesion among Russians and Greeks, was a more valid and viable 
cultural bond than the reviving interest in classical Greece. In the theo-
cratic society of the Ottoman Empire, which divided its subjects into mil-
lets (nations) based on religion, religious affiliations became the major 
factor in determining cultural identity. For most Greeks, Orthodoxy, not 
the classical heritage, provided hope and sustenance and served as a value 
system upon which they based their life and world view. In contrast to 
most Westerners' preoccupation with the glory of ancient Greece, Russian 
philhellenism thus presented a more balanced image of the Greeks, one 
which included both the classical and Byzantine dimensions of the Greek 
experience. 
The outbreak of the Greek revolt confronted Russia with a number of 
challenges and opportunities. For the tsarist regime, the uprising posed the 
dilemma of preserving the status quo or supporting Greek coreligionists in 
revolt against their "legitimate" ruler, the sultan. Despite the tsar's reserva-
tion about disturbing the balance of power and order of legitimacy, the 
possibility of Russian intervention in the Greek crisis raised the prospect of 
an expansionist Eastern policy directed not so much toward fulfilling 
Greek national aspirations as toward reaping additional strategic gains. In 
this context, the Greek issue could conceivably be used as a pretext to pro-
tect and extend Russian influence in the Balkans, Constantinople, and the 
Black Sea. 
For most of Russian educated society, on the other hand, the revolt 
became synonymous with the continued existence of the Greeks as a cul-
ttlral entity. At stake was the very survival not only of the Greeks but of 
Russia's traditional bonds and associations with the Greek East, particu-
larly such cherished shrines as the Holy Places in Jerusalem, Mt. Athos, 
and St. Catherine's on Mt. Sinai. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that 
the Greek revolt stimulated several manifestations of Russian public 
support. 
Indeed, the Greek cause aroused an enthusiastic reaction from nearly 
all sectors of Russian society, which for a long time held the notion that 
imperial Russia had a vital role to play in protecting and liberating the 
Sultan's Orthodox subjects. Russian philhellenism became a broadly based 
movement, cutting across political and ideological camps and gathering 
support from all major sosloviia or social groups. Comprised of indigenous 
and Western-adopted elements, Russian philhellenism expressed apprecia-
tion for the classical, Byzantine, and modern Greek experience and sup-
port for the Greek national struggle. 
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Widespread public backing of the Greek issue is readily seen in the 
numerous agencies or lobby groups which manifested and promoted Rus-
sian philhellenism. An amorphous war-party, composed of reform-minded 
"liberals" and staunch advocates of tsarist autocracy, called for Russian 
intervention on the Greek's behalf. Its members ranged from conservative 
government officials who, as spokesmen of official policy, viewed the 
Greek affair through the prism of orthodoxy and the dynamics of imperial 
expansion, to liberal-minded Decembrists, who, as proponents of the polit-
ical ideals of the French Revolution, associated the Greek revolt with 
aspirations for liberal reform and national renewal in Russia. 
The Greek conflict struck a responsive chord in Russian classical 
scholars and romanticist poets. For classicists such as Ivan 1. Martynovand 
Nikolai 1. Gnedich, the revolt of the modern Greeks stimulated renewed 
zeal to study and appreciate the classical heritage. Russian classical studies 
made significant strides in the 1820s, best seen in Martynov's 26-volume 
bilingual translation of Greek classics (Grecheskie klassiki) and Gnedich's 
translation of the Iliad. Gnedich also became a pioneer in the development 
of modern Greek studies in Russia as a result of his translation of C. Four-
iel's work on modern Greek folk songs. For Pushkin and other Russian 
poets of the '20s, the Greek cause became a source of literary inspiration, 
clearly evinced in the numerous philhellenic poems comparing the deeds 
of contemporary Greek warriors to those of classical heroes. 
The Greek affair also became a compelling news feature for Russian 
journalists and publicists. Publicistic coverage of the revolt and Greek-
related themes was closely bound to the other manifestation~ of Russian 
philhellenism. By offering readers a diversified body of information on the 
Greek situation, Russian periodicals, including such prominent ones as Syn 
otechestve, Vestnik Europy, and Moskovskii telegraj, to name but a few, 
reflected and helped shape Russian educated opinion on the Greek issue. 
Finally, and the aspect to be examined in detail below, the Russian 
government and church hierarchs organized the collection of humanitar-
ian relief aid. The study of the variety and diversity of Russian response 
to the Greek War of Independence raises the crucial question of Russian 
public opinion. It is essential to note that, since the vast majority of Rus-
sian society was still illiterate, "educated society" or "public opinion" con-
sisted of a small but influential fraction of the population. Naturally, the 
Russian philhellenic movement drew its most vocal supporters from the 
educated elite. But the collection of relief aid on the district and parish 
level clearly indicate that the appeal of the Greek cause extended far 
beyond the educated and urbanized stratum of Russian society. Indeed, in 
many respects Russian relief assistance offers the most illuminating index 
to measure the extent and intensity of public response to the Greek revolt. 
The tsarist regime and Russian society found common cause during 
the Greek War of Independence by organizing humanitarian relief assis-
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tance. For the tsars, relief aid to Greek coreligionists became a means to 
demonstrate continued support of the Sultan's Orthodox subjects, thereby 
upholding Russia's traditional role as protector of Orthodoxy. Government 
policy was also determined in part by the hope of encouraging Greeks from 
the Ottoman Empire to settle permanently in southern Russia in order to 
stimulate the economic development of the still underpopulated steppe 
region. For Russian society, some form of concrete assistance was all the 
more urgent in view of Russia's non-intervention in the Greek crisis. 
The relief drives, coordinated by the government and the church, 
received widespread support from all major social groups. By underscoring 
Russia's traditional religious and cultural bonds with the Greek East, the 
regime lent further credence to the politically safe, and government-
endorsed, view that the Greek revolt was primarily a religious struggle 
between the forces of Islam and Orthodoxy rather than an insurgent 
movement which sought to create a constitutional and independent 
national state. Because of the primacy of the religious element in urging 
public support, humanitarian relief assistance for the Greeks is appropri-
ately labeled "philorthodox" and represented a major aspect of the Russian 
philhellenic movement. 
More so than any other manifestation of Russian philhellenism, relief 
aid must be seen in the context of Russia's post-Byzantine ties to the Greek 
world. Despite the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans and Constantinople, 
Orthodoxy continued to provide a common bond between Russia and the 
Greek East and, more crucially, opened up numerous avenues of contact. 
These points of contact and interaction included the settlement of Greeks 
in Russia; Russian pilgrimages to Mt. Athos, Mt. Sinai, Jerusalem, and 
other shrines of Orthodoxy; Muscovy's official relations with the four 
eastern patriarchates; and the steady stream of Greek clergymen who came 
to Russia in search of funds to rebuild monasteries, pay taxes and restore 
beleagured sees from financial exploitation by Turkish authorities. In a 
very real sense, phil orthodox relief was natural and understandable in 
view of the large-scale alms which the tsars had distributed to Greek reli-
gious pilgrims. Indeed, no other great power had rendered as much mate-
rial assistance to help alleviate the plight of the Greek church under 
Turkish rule. 
Turkish reprisals against Greeks in 1821 provided the spark for Rus-
sian relief efforts. Patriarch Gregorios of Constantinople, despite his offi-
cial denunciation of Ypsilantis, the commander of Greek insurgents in 
Moldavia, was guilty in the sultan's eyes of failing to perform his funda-
mental duty as head of the Orthodox millet, namely, to ensure Greek 
obedience and submission to Ottoman rule. S The hanging of Patriarch 
Gregorios on Easter Sunday, April 1821, together with the execution of 
numerous church hierarchs and Phanariots, led to random attacks against 
Greek Christians. 6 Turkish crowds roamed the streets of the capital, de-
Russian Relief during the Greek War of Independence 35 
stroying or pillaging Greek churches and religious shrines. Outbreaks of 
violence also occurred against the Greek population of Adrianople, 
Smyrna, Thessaloniki, Crete, and Cyprus, events which were regularly 
reported in the Russian periodical press. 7 
To aqd insult to injury, Turkish authorities left Gregorios's corpse 
hanging at the Phanar gate, thus requiring anyone entering the Greek 
quarter of Constantinople to push the body aside. After three days, the 
Turks ordered several of the capital's Jewish inhabitants to remove the 
body, which was then dragged through the streets and thrown into the 
harbor. The corpse was eventually retrieved by an Ionian merchant vessel, 
captained by I. N. Sklavos, which sailed to Odessa. In June 1821, at the 
tsar's behest, local government and church authorities, as well as Odessa's 
Greek community, accorded Gregorios a ceremonial funeral replete with 
all the honors befitting his high status in the Orthodox church. 8 
The funeral sermon was delivered by the clergyman and educator 
Konstantinos Oikonomos, a close friend and associate of the Patriarch who 
fled to Odessa just before the onset of Turkish reprisals. Oikonomos's ten-
year stay in Russia (1821-1831), where he published several religious and 
philological works, provides another example of an enlightened Greek 
cleric who not only pursued scholarly research in Russia but became an 
ardent spokesman for Greek national concerns, specifically Russian-
sponsored deliverance of the Greek East. 9 
Oikonomos's sermon, one of several he delivered in Odessa in 1821 
and 1822 on behalf of the Greek cause, eloquently praised Gregorios's 
devotion to his faith and calling. Making explicit reference to the tradi-
tional bonds uniting the Russian and Greek worlds, he underscored the 
symbolic significance of the Patriarch's arrival in Odessa, an event which 
"renews and manifests after so many centuries the indissoluble and essen-
tial unity which has always existed between the Greek and Russian 
churches." With the death of Gregorios, the Greek church now placed its 
hopes on "Emperor Alexander, the successor of St. Vladimir, the august 
defender of the Orthodox church." Oikonomos appealed to the tsar to offer 
sanctuary to the wave of Greek refugees seeking haven "under the wings 
of the great eagle of Russia." In conclusion, Oikonomos prayed for Greek 
victory against the infidel and called on Greeks in Russia to assist their 
compatriots. to 
While the Patriarch's execution aroused Russian religious indignation, 
the immediate backdrop to the organization of relief aid was provided by 
the large influx of Greeks to Bessarabia and Odessa. Either as refugees flee-
ing Turkish reprisals or as insurgents in search of asylum after Ypsilantis's 
defeat, thousands of impoverished Greeks abandoned homes, property, 
and possessions and crossed the border into Russia. General I van N. Inzov, 
Military Governor-General of Bessarabia, reported to General Wittgen-
stein of the Ukraine-based Second Army that, from February to April 
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1821, roughly 1,230 refugees of diverse social origin arrived in Bessarabia, 
while in one day in May more than 1,500 came. By mid-1822, according 
to Count Alexander F. Langeron, Military Governor-General of New Rus-
sia, more than 12,000 had been registered by customs and quarantine 
officials in Odessa. l1 Greek migration to Russia continued throughout the 
revolt. As in past conflicts between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 brought in its wake another wave of 
uprooted Greeks, with 360 families settling in Odessa, Bessarabia, and the 
Crimea. 12 
The plight of the refugees drew the atf:ention and concern of local 
authorities in southern Russia, including the phil hellenic Decembrist 
officers Pavel I. PesteI' and Mikhail F. OrlOY, both of whom urged Inzov 
to provide food, shelter and medical treatment. 13 Initial funds for such 
assistance came from local government revenues in Bessarabia and Odessa. 
But clearly these were but stop-gap measures which could only proffer 
short-term help and hardly meet the needs of the increasing wave of 
insurgents and refugees seeking haven in Russia. A large-scale relief pro-
gram was needed, one organized by the central government and able to 
channel contributions from all sectors of Russian society. 
In, July 1821, Alexander I approved the opening of a subscription 
campaign to raise money for the refugees in Odessa and Bessarabia. 14 It is 
not precisely clear who initiated the proposal. Prince Aleksandr N. Golit-
syn, Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Enlightenment, who played 
the most vital role in organizing and coordinating the relief drive, noted 
in his correspondence to Russian church hierarchs that "several persons, 
moved by sympathy for residents of Greece who have abandoned their 
country, homes, property ... , have raised the idea of opening a sub-
scription on behalf of unfortunate refugees who by the thousands stream 
into Odessa and Bessarabia."15 Although Golitsyn did not specify who 
these "several persons" were, it is safe to assume that likely candidates 
included such prominent Greeks as Oikonomos; loannes Kapodistrias, who 
during his tenure as Russian foreign minister (1815-1822) promoted Greek 
interests in Russian official and unofficial circles; and Alexandros S. 
Stourdzas, a close associate of Kapodistrias and a specialist in Balkan 
affairs at the Russian Foreign Ministry.16 For all three, organizing Greek 
relief would have represented not only a natural extension of their cultural 
patriotism but also a means to render concrete assistance to their compa-
triots. 
Another possible candidate was Golitsyn himself, one of several high 
Russian officials who expressed support for the Greek revolt. 17 Golitsyn 
was known for his commitment to benevolent projects. His endorsement 
of Greek relief programs should in fact be seen in the context of his involve-
ment in several philanthropic endeavors, most notably the Prison Reform, 
Bible, and Imperial Philanthropic Societies, all of which were inspired by 
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humanitarian and religious motives. Regardless of who actually initiated 
the relief project, Golitsyn's support and participation were inpispensable. 
His tenure in high office throughout Alexander's reign made him one of the 
tsar's most trusted advisers and confidants. In many instances, Golitsyn 
was the man through whom the tsar could be reached on a particular 
problem or issue requiring immediate decision. 18 
Golitsyn officially launched the relief drive on behalf of Greek refu-
gees in a written announcement (24 July 1821). Couched in religious 
terms, it underscored the subscription campaign's philanthropic and 
humanitarian motives: 
The terrible events in Constantinople are known to all Russians. Many of our 
coreligionists, in order to escape death, have fled to the borders of Russia. 
Thousands of unfortunate victims of persecution, as of March, continue to 
seek asylum in Odessa and Bessarabia. The refugees are received hospitably, 
thanks to the mercy of the tsar and the compassion of local inhabitants. But 
the assistance rendered them is insufficient to care for such a large number 
of families, increasing from day to day. In just one day in Odessa, they num-
bered almost 4,000. Salvaging only their life and the honor of their women 
and children, they lost all property and possessions. Such a disastrous lot of 
our brothers by itself calls for help. Pious Christians, in faith and love, will 
certainly lend a helping hand and will not refuse to take part in the newly 
opened subscription on behalf of Greek and Moldavian refugees in Odessa 
and Bessarabia. 19 
Golitsyn's announcement went on to say that donations for relief aid would 
be sent to Governors-General Inzov and Langeron for distribution to indi-
viduals and families in the greatest need of help. 
Along with copies of the announcement, Golitsyn sent a special cover 
letter to Russian church hierarchs and military and civilian governors, 
urging them to organize and collect donations in their respective eparchies 
(dioceses) and gubernii (provinces). Golitsyn encouraged clerical and 
secular authorities "to call on persons . . . , who are known to you by 
their love and compassion, to take part in this benevolent enterprise." In 
fulfilling the tsar's will, church and government authorities were not to 
refrain from using their high position and influence in order to facilitate 
the success of the relief drive. Like the proclamation itself, Golitsyn's cover 
letter stressed the religious aspect of the relief effort. It also suggested 
Russia's debt to Byzantium for adopting Christianity: 
When it pleased providence to bring them to Russia and preserve their life 
amidst horrors of death, they were without doubt not deceived in the hope 
that they would find hospitality and help within the blessed borders of the 
fatherland of those who at one time borrowed from them [the Greeks] the 
sacred learning of the gospel, the teaching of mercy, love, and mutual help.20 
A different cover letter was sent to the military governors-general of 
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Moscow (Prince D. S. Golitsyn), the Ukraine (Prince Nikolai G. Repnin-
Volkonskii), and St. Petersburg (Count M. A. Miloradovich). It called on 
them to encourage donations from the inhabitants of their respective re-
gions, particularly from their numerous Greek subjects who were "obliged 
by a sacred duty not to abandon help to their suffering compatriots."21 
In conjunction with this, Golitsyn forwarded copies of his announce-
ment directly to the Greek communities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and 
Odessa. His accompanying cover letter urged Greeks to assist compatriots 
both out of humanitarian impulse and love of fatherland. Golitsyn con-
cluded his letter to the Greeks by mentioning Europe's debt to classical 
Greek civilization and Russia's special debt to Byzantium: 
Without a doubt the success of such a benevolent undertaking will justify the 
expectations of friends of humanity who desire to render help to the sons of 
that country which fostered enlightenment in Europe and to which Russia is 
even more obliged having borrowed from it the enlightenment of faith, 
which firmly established the saving banner of the gospels on the ruins of 
paganism.22 
Golitsyns's remarks shed light on the uniqueness of Russian philhellenism, 
a movement which in a sense represented the convergence of two forces, 
Russia's growing appreciation of the classical heritage and its traditional 
religious ties to the Orthodox East. 
In addition to church hierarchs, provincial governors, and Greek 
communities, Golitsyn addressed his announcement to a variety of poten-
tial sources of help. He requested members of the Russian nobility "who 
had demonstrated support in the past for humanitarian and philanthropic 
endeavors" not to stint in rendering aid to indigent Greeks. 23 City officials 
of St. Petersburg were called upon to enlist the support of merchants, both 
local and out-of-towners, and the social group [soslovie] of industrious 
artisans to help alleviate the plight of Greek arrivals. "I am sure," Golitsyn 
continued, "that Russian merchants are eager to demonstrate once again 
their virtue in philanthropic works, which can only bring eternal treasure 
and before which all the riches of the world are nothing."24 In his note to 
the hetman of the Don Cossacks, Golitsyn stated that the "brave and 
courageous residents of the Don have never been alien to compassion and 
humanity."25 Finally, Golitsyn encouraged the participation of Catholic, 
Uniate, and Armenian Orthodox church hierarchs, emphasizing that "you, 
as guardians of Christian life, will no doubt alleviate their lot. "26 
Along with the patriarch's martyrdom and the flood of refugees to 
Russia, other events inflamed Russian religious sentiment and inspired 
philanthropic relief efforts. Throughout the Greek revolt, as had been the 
case in the Ottoman Empire's wars with Christian Europe since the fif-
teenth century, it was not uncommon for Turkish troops to take prisoners 
of war as booty. Christian captives were forcibly converted to Islam and 
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became valuable commodities in the empire's slave trade, which included 
such cities as Constantinople, Smyrna, Aleppo, and Alexandria. 27 From 
June 1821 to April 1822, most of the inhabitants of Kassandra, one of the 
three elongated peninsulas of Chalkidiki in Macedonia; Kydonies, a town 
on the coast of Asia Minor; and the island of Chios, located but five miles 
from the Turkish mainland, were either displaced, massacred or en-
slaved. 28 
The Chios massacre (April 1822), more than any other episode in the 
revolt, stirred European and Russian public opinion. Since its conquest by 
the Turks (1566), Chios had enjoyed a degree of political autonomy and 
had developed a prosperous economy. With the expansion of Greek com-
merce, Chios became a commercial and cultural center in the Levant. In 
February 1822, when a band of overzealous adventurers from the neigh-
boring island of Samos landed on Chios and raised the flag of "liberation," 
most Chiots were cautious and skeptical about their island's chances of 
remaining independent. Many felt that the bold action of the Samiots 
jeopardized Chios' unique status. They also raised the crucial question of 
how successful a revolt on Chios could be given its close proximity to 
Turkey, not to mention its great distance from Hydra, the base of Greek 
naval operations. Chiot fears were fully borne out with the appearance of 
the Turkish fleet. The island's Samiot defenders, who had come to coerce 
the Chiots to accept liberation, hastily fled and abandoned the islanders 
to their fate. 
Turkish forces, with the assistance of unruly armed masses who 
crossed over in small boats from the mainland, exacted a high price. The 
inhabitants of Chios, most of them unarmed, were treated as insurgents. 
Some of the more wealthy families were able to buy Turkish protection for 
large sums of money, while others managed to escape to Psara and other 
Greek islands. Estimates vary on the extent of the casualities. Of Chios' 
population of 120,000, roughly 50,000 were massacred, 45,000 were en-
slaved, 30,000 fled, and 2,000 remained on the gutted and ruined island. 29 
British diplomatic documents indicate the plight of the Chiots taken cap-
tive, most of whom were women and children. In a letter to the Levant 
Company (May 1822), John Cartwright, British Consul in Constantinople, 
noted the miserable lot of the survivors: "The females and children are 
doomed to slavery from which there will be little chance of redemption, 
as all possible means are taken to prevent the sale of them to Christians. "30 
The name of Chios became familiar to the world at large as a result 
of the vengeance exacted by the Turks. The incident gave fresh impetus to 
the wave of European philhellenism and was immortalized in Delacroix's 
famous painting, Scenes from the Massacre of Chios (1824). The Russian 
response took the form of a second subscription campaign to collect ransom 
money for enslaved Greeks from Chios, Kassandra, and Kydonies. 
The initiative for the second relief drive came from three Greek clerics 
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in Bessarabia - Metropolitan Grigorii Irinopol'skii, Bishop Konstantin 
Buzevskii, and Archimandrite Parfenii. On 3 July 1822, they petitioned the 
tsar to accept donations among the Greeks of Russia in order to ransom 
Greek captives. Emphasizing their religious and humanitarian intentions, 
the clerics focused the appeal on the plight of Greeks who were forced to 
convert to Islam and sold into slavery: "We hope that your Imperial 
Majesty, in considering the nature of such a charitable undertaking, will 
deign in your mercy and extreme piety to grant us your high permission 
in order to save from the abyss of perdition as many Christians as provi-
dence will allow."31 
Although addressed to Alexander I, the three Greek clerics did not 
send their petition directly to the tsar. Instead, according to Governor-
General Inzov's letter (16 July 1822) to Kapodistrias, they requested Inzov 
to convey the proposal to Alexander, convinced that this would attach a 
greater degree of respectability and legitimacy to the project than if they 
themselves sent it. 32 Most likely, word reached the tsar either directly from 
Inzov or from a close adviser, such as Kapodistrias or Golitsyn, both of 
whom were in regular correspondence with local authorities in Bessarabia 
and New Russia. After reading it on 3 August in Tsarskoe Selo, Alexander 
approved the proposal. 33 
On 22 August, Minister of Interior Count Viktor Kochubei notified 
Inzov of the tsar's endorsement of the new subscription drive to raise 
ransom funds. Kochubei also requested Inzov to find out, if at all possible, 
the approximate number of captive Greeks and the approximate amount 
of money needed for their release. 34 Inzov replied that, according to vari-
ous direct and indirect sources, which he did not specify, the Greek clerics 
estimated that roughly 100,000 Greeks had been enslaved as a result of the 
events in Kassandra, Kydonies, and Chios. Each captive could be ran-
somed, Inzov went on, for about five rubles; thus a working sum of at least 
500,000 rubles had to be raised. 3s 
The large number of Greek captives, most of whom were held in Con-
stantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo, altered the original proposal which had 
been limited to the collection of ransom funds from the Greek communities 
of Russia. In a despatch to Golitsyn (25 October 1822), Minister of Interior 
Kochubei noted that, in view of the sizable number of Greeks held captive, 
the tsar had broadened the original proposal in order to enlist contribu-
tions from all Russian subjects, both Greek and non-Greek, who were 
"willing to take an active part in this feat of humanity." Informing Golit-
syn of the approximate number of captives and the working sum needed 
for their redemption, Kochubei concluded his letter with the following: 
With regret we must realize that we cannot flatter ourselves with the hope 
of ransoming all our coreligionists cast into captivity by recent disastrous 
events. But the eager benevolence of your Highness without a doubt will not 
grow cool. It is equally comforting to think that, out of a sense of humanity 
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and Christian duty, we can save at least a few from the most terrible slavery 
and perilous temptations [a reference to the prospect of captives converting 
to Islam and thus alleviating their plight]. 36 
Similar to his announcement to assist Greek refugees, Golitsyn's 
proclamation on the ransom subscription, approved by the Holy Synod in 
November 1822, underscored its humanitarian objective. Golitsyn asserted 
that the plight of captive Greeks offered a new occasion for pious Russians, 
inspired by faith and humanity, "to extend a helping hand to our coreli-
gionists who are saddled with all the despondencies of captivity and are 
threatened to be cut off from the Church of Christ." The proclamation 
ended with an appeal: 
. . now is the time to show that fortune and wealth have value only when 
used for the salvation of our neighbors. To return to the fold of the church 
its sons ... ,to disconsolate fathers their children, and to hopeless children 
their fathers - this is a feat of worthy charitable zeal for all friends of 
humanity.37 
As with the first subscription drive for Greek refugees, Golitsyn sent 
copies of the announcement to all eparchial church hierarchs - such as 
Metropolitans Filaret of Moscow, Serafim of St. Petersburg and Novgorod, 
Evgenii of Kiev, and Archbishops A vraam of Astrakhan and Amvrossii of 
Kazan. 38 To publicize the new campaign among the Greeks, Golitsyn 
notified well-known merchants who were influential and respected com-
munity leaders - Z. Zosimas and N. Patsimadis of Moscow; I. Varvakis of 
Taganrog; and D. Inglezis, A. Mavros, and T. Seraphinos of Odessa. 39 
Upon Golitsyn's urging, Minister of Interior Kochubei instructed the 
governors-general of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Ukraine to take all 
necessary measures in order to facilitate the successful organization and 
operation of the new subscription effort. Appealing to them that "faith and 
humanity must arouse zeal to alleviate the suffering of coreligionists," 
Kochubei requested the governors-general to encourage the direct partici-
pation of local marshals of nobility, rural and town police superintendents 
(ispravniki), and all other provincial, regional, and district officials. 40 
The Russian government and society at large responded enthusiasti-
cally to both relief drives. Among the most generous supporters of philor-
thodox assistance were members of the imperial family. Their donations 
came as no surprise and were expected in view of the tsars' history of send-
ing large contributions to religious shrines in the Greek East, most notably 
Mt. Athos, St. Catherine's, and the Holy Places. Alexander donated an 
initial 150,000 rubles for the plight of Greek refugees. 41 Realizing that this 
sum was insufficient to meet the daily needs of an increasing number of 
newcomers, the tsar instructed Minister of Finance Dmitrii Gur'ev to make 
monthly transfers of 13,000 rubles from the central treasury to local 
authorities in Bessarabia and New Russia. Nicholas continued the monthly 
42 Theophilus Prousis 
transfers; at one point (31 December 1827), he ordered Count Pahlen, 
Governor-General of New Russia, to borrow 70,000 rubles from the Bes-
sarabian oblast' treasury in order to continue distributing "indispensable 
aid to Greek arrivals."42 As a result of the monthly donations from the 
central treasury in St. Petersburg, which extended from January 1822 to 
August 1830, roughly 1.5 million rubles were sent to local authorities in 
southern Russia on behalf of the refugees. Nicholas terminated such aid 
upon the emergence of independent Greece, convinced that the end of 
Greek-Turkish hostilities would allow Greeks to return to their former 
homes or to independent Greece without obstacle. 43 
Other members of the imperial family supporting Greek relief in-
cluded Empress Dowager Mariia Fedorovna, the mother of Alexander and 
Nicholas, who contributed 15,000 rubles for the refugees. 44 Empress Eliza-
veta Alekseevna, Alexander's wife, was informed of the refugee subscrip-
tion campaign by one of her ladies-in-waiting, Roxandra Stourdza-Edling, 
the sister of Alexandros Stourdzas and a generous patron of Greek educa-
tional endeavors. The empress supported the relief effort out of humanitar-
ian and Christian sentiment, as evinced in her letter of thanks to Stourdza-
Edling for "showing me the way to alleviate the lot of unfortunate victims 
with such a praiseworthy and noble cause. "45 
Numerous government ministries and departments supported the 
relief campaigns, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of Justice, and the Departments of Foreign Trade, Engineering, and Reli-
gious Affairs.46 In most cases, the head of a particular department or 
ministry organized the collection of contributions from high- and low-
ranking officials and civil servants under his authority. In several cases, 
government ministers and high officials made substantial donations. As 
noted, Minister of Interior Kochubei, at Golitsyn's behest, gave explicit 
instructions to the governors-general of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the 
Ukraine, requesting them to coordinate and facilitate the collection of 
ransom funds in their respective regions. Kochubei himself contributed 
3,000 rubles to both relief drives. 47 Minister of Finance Gur'ev and 
Comptroller Baron B. B. Kampenhausen also made significant personal 
donations. 48 Prince Adam Czartoryski, Curator of Vilna University, not 
only contributed 2,000 rubles but organized the collection of funds from 
university officials, faculty, and regional school supervisers under his juris-
diction. 49 Other educational institutions participating in the relief drives 
were Kazan University, the Academy of Sciences, and the Imperial 
Lyceum in Tsarkoe Selo. 50 
By far the largest and most consistent donations from government 
sources came from the Postal Department, which is readily understandable 
in view of Golitsyn's position as chief administrator of Russia's postal sys-
tem. Given his sponsorship and full support of both subscription cam-
 paigns, it was natural that he would attempt to utilize postal departments 
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in the capitals and gubernii to organize and mobilize relief aid. In addi-
tion, Golitsyn was assisted by the Grecophiles Aleksandr la. Bulgakov and 
his brother Konstantin, directors of the postal districts of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. Both did their utmost to encourage gubernii and district postal 
units to collect relief funds. As the detailed postal records indicate, Golit-
syn and the Bulgakovs succeeded in amassing sizable donations from post-
masters and postal officials throughout the Russian empire. 51 
Russian military elements, many of whom favored tsarist intervention 
on the Greeks' behalf, registered support for the Greek cause by contribut-
ing to relief efforts. Donations were made by the prestigious imperial 
guard regiments - including the Preobrazhenskii, Semenovskii, Izmailov-
skii, and Hussar Regiments - and the Don Cossacks. 52 General Wittgen-
stein collected 4,000 rubles from the ranks of the Second Army stationed 
in the Ukraine and Bessarabia. 53 In sending their donations to Golitsyn, 
military officers often expressed statements of support for the Greeks. 
General lakov A. Potemkin of Voronezh wrote that he collected 970 rubles 
from staff officers "desiring to take part in this humanitarian feat of saving 
coreligionists. "54 Similarly, Colonel Arkadii Kochubei expressed "sincere 
gratitude for allowing me to take part in this endeavor which is so in line 
with the principles of our faith and my personal feelings." Kochubei went 
on to state the following: 
The donation of 250 rubles is from me and several others who eqIpathize with 
the calamitous condition of Greeks who are perishing, under the burden of 
barbarians, for the Orthodox church and the freedom of their fatherland. I 
am sure that your benevolent intentions will be completely successful. Cer-
tainly each Russian will not be indifferent to the sufferings of coreligionists 
and will rush, each according to his means, to participate in this useful 
campaign for our unfortunate brothers. ss 
Kochubei's remarks indicate that he was one of the few supporters of Greek 
relief who made direct reference to the political aspect of the Greek 
revolt - "freedom of their fatherland" - as well as its religious dimension, 
which, in contrast to the former, was the focal point for Golitsyn and the 
tsarist regime. 
Philorthodox assistance provides the most useful means to assess the 
nature and extent of Russian public response to the Greek War of Inde-
pendence. Golitsyn received donations from eparchies and gubernii span-
ning the entire Russian Empire - from the Kingdom of Poland to Tobolsk, 
Omsk, and Irkutsk in Siberia, and from Finland and the Baltic region to 
Astrakhan and Odessa. Eparchy and gubernii files clearly reveal the popu-
larity and appeal of the Greek cause at the grassroots level of Russian soci-
ety. Most of these files are replete with entries listing the contributors, their 
social status and occupations, and the specific amount of their donations. 
One readily sees that the widest possible cross-section of Russian society 
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took an active part. All major social groups contributed - nobility; church 
hierarchs, monks, and parish priests; merchants and townsmen; and 
peasants. 
Based on eparchy and gubernii records, one can reconstruct the pro-
cedure for collecting Greek relief. The leading church hierarch of a partic-
ular eparchy - such as Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow, Metropolitan 
Serafim of St. Petersburg and Novgorod, or Archbiship Amvrossii of 
Kazan - called on all clergymen and clerical institutions within the region 
to coordinate and organize the collection of donations. As in other 
eparchial matters, the consistory and chancery of each eparchy ensured 
that ecclesiastical and religious policy percolated downward to individual 
parishes. At the grassroots level, organization of Greek relief entailed 
parish priests and deacons mentioning the subscription campaigns in 
sermons to villagers and townsmen and urging would-be contributors "to 
help save coreligionists who are suffering in Odessa and Kishinev" or, in 
the case of the ransom drive, "to redeem Greeks of Chios, Kassandra, and 
Kydonies held in Turkish captivity. "56 
Gubernii records reveal a similar procedure. The civilian or military 
governor of a particular region called on marshals of nobility, city officials, 
and town and country police superintendents (ispravniki) to help organize 
and collect funds from local residents. Eparchy and gubernii files also 
indicate that copies of Golitsyn's announcements, both printed and hand-
written, circulated widely. 
Once donations were collected and recorded, the governor of a partic-
ular guberniia, or church hierarch in the case of an eparchy, sent the funds 
to Golitsyn with an accompanying cover letter which usually affirmed 
continued support for the relief efforts and pledged to keep the subscrip-
tions open. As expected, the largest donations were forthcoming from 
densely populated eparchies and gubernii - Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nov-
gorod, Pskov, Kiev, Smolensk, Kharkov, Mogilev, Kazan, Astrakhan, 
Kursk, Tver, Kaluga, Iaroslav, Kostroma, Riazan, Voronezh, and Ekateri-
noslav. 57 
Some of the more revealing files are those from distant regions, such 
as Perm and Orenburg in the Urals and the Siberian towns of Tobolsk, 
Tomsk, and Irkutsk. 58 While donations from these areas were understand-
ably lower than those from densely populated eparchies and gubernii, they 
clearly indicate that relief drives were not restricted to major centers but 
extended to the far reaches of the Russian Empire. For example, Archbi-
shop Amvrossii of Tobolsk informed Golitsyn (December 1821) that 1,833 
rubles had been collected from local clergy and laymen on behalf of "un-
fortunate Greeks seeking salvation in Russia."59 In January 1824, he noti-
fied Golitsyn that 11,685 rubles had been raised to ransom Greek slaves. 6o 
Similarly, the eparchy of Irkutsk, which was under the jurisdiction of 
Bishop Mikhail, had raised 2,720 rubles in ransom money as of March 
1824. 61 
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The existence of eparchy and gubernii records, particularly the de-
tailed manner in which they were kept, allows one to grasp the broad 
backing the relief campaigns received from diverse social elements in 
Russia. Of the major sosioviia, the nobility made the largest contributions. 
In most cases, local marshals of the nobility were instrumental in coordi-
nating the collection of relief funds. 62 That the Greek cause appealed to the 
upper crest of Russian society is evinced in the sizable donations from well-
known princes and counts: Anna A. Orlov-Chesmenskaia (8,000 r.), 
Dmitrii N. Sheremetev (7,000 r.), Nikolai P. Rumiantsev (2,500 r.), the 
Lobanov-Rostovskii family (2,200 r.), Petr K. Razumovskii (2,000 r.), 
Dmitrii P. Buturlin (1,500 r.), Ivan 1. Bariatinskii (1,500 r.), V. Dolgoru-
kov (1,500 r.), Nikolai Iusupov (1,500 r.), Aleksei G. Bezborodko (1,200 
r.), Andrei Gagarin (500 r.), and many others.63 Another noteworthy 
contribution was that of Prince Aleksei B. Kurakin who, in addition to 
donating 3,000 rubles for the refugees, pledged the same amount annually 
to support Greek families until they could return home. 64 From their cor-
respondence to Golitsyn, most princes and counts contributed out of reli-
gious and humanitarian sentiment. Countess Anna A. Orlov-Chesmen-
skaia expressed gratitude in being allowed to take part in "this God-pleas-
ing cause" to assist "our brothers by faith and Christian love." Similarly, 
Count D. N. Sheremetev wrote of his intention to contribute "with an open 
heart ... to help alleviate the burdensome lot of our co religionists seek-
ing salvation from Turkish barbarism."65 
Russian church hierarchs not only organized relief drives in their 
eparchies but made substantial personal contributions, such as Metropoli-
tan Filaret of Moscow who gave 1,000 rubles on behalf of Greek captives. 66 
Large donations were also forthcoming from monks, abbots, and 
archimandrites of well-known monasteries in Petersburg and Moscow-
Aleksandr Nevskii, Donskoi, Novospasskii, Novodevichyi, Troitskii, 
Simeonovskii, Rozhdestvenskii, Predtechenskii. 67 Eparchy files, such as 
those from Kazan and Kursk, indicate that the bulk of contributors were 
humble clergymen - parish priests and deacons - who, although legal 
members of the privileged dukhovenstvo (priesthood), eked out a meager 
existence not far removed from that of the peasantry. 68 
The popular or truly grassroots appeal of philorthodox relief is best 
seen in donations from Russian merchants, townsmen, and peasants. 
Merchant-townsmen contributions were received from Smolensk, Nov-
gorod, and Moscow. 69 The largest such donation came from the merchants 
of St. Petersburg, who gave 25,000 rubles in 1821-1822 on behalf of Greek 
refugees. 7o Numerous Russian and German craft guilds in Petersburg-
tailors, bakers, bootmakers, blacksmiths, makers of surgical and medical 
instruments - donated 5,000 rubles for refugees, with contributions rang-
ing from 5 to 1,000 rubles.71 Similarly, funds were raised from masters, 
craftsmen, apprentices, and workers at the Aleksandrovskii textile factory 
in St. Petersburg. 72 The guberniia file from Vladimir-Suzdal, which is one 
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of the best kept and most useful files to discern the grassroots appeal of the 
Greek cause, contains listings of donations not only from local merchants 
and townsmen but also from obviously well-off peasants in the village of 
Manisheva and the town of Suzdal, with contributions ranging from 1 to 
1,000 rubles. 7J In most regions, peasant donations were much smaller, 
ranging from 10 kopeks to 3 rubles. 
Greek relief endeavors met with support from diverse ethnic and 
religious elements within the Russian Empire. Catholic hierarchs in Mogi-
lev and Vilna translated Golitsyn's announcements into Polish and urged 
all Catholics to contribute on behalf of "fellow Christians." In addition to 
donations from the Kingdom of Poland and Roman Catholic monasteries 
in the Ukraine, Uniates and Evangelicals also raised relief aid. 74 Governor-
General of Finland Baron von Stein collected 20,000 rubles in 1822-1823, 
while Baltic Germans, primarily pastors, merchants, and town officials 
from the towns of Riga, Dorpat, and Vyborg, were also encouraged to 
raise funds. 75 From Stockholm, a pastor Dunkel of the Dutch Reformed 
Church called on all "German friends of Greece and humanity in Swedish 
and Russian lands to contribute on behalf of Christianity."76 In Georgia, 
Exarch lona was instrumental in gathering donations from local clergy, 
the military, and members of the local Muslim community. 77 
Armenian support for the Greek cause was understandable given the 
close relations between the Armenian and Greek communities in Russia, 
not to mention their shared experience of Ottoman subjugation. Recent 
Soviet scholarship has attempted to show the impact of the Greek revolt 
on the development of an Armenian national consciousness. 78 Archbishop 
loann of Astrakhan's Armenian community informed Golitsyn that he col-
lected 2,235 rubles from "people of the Armenian nation on behalf of suf-
fering Greeks. "79 Some Armenians equated the plight of Greek refugees 
and captives with that of their Armenian compatriots in the Ottoman 
Empire. An Armenian civil servant in Moscow, State Counsellor lakim 
Lazarev, who donated 500 rubles on behalf of the refugees, noted: 
the poor state of the Greeks truly merits compassion, but it is not superfluous 
to point out that, similar to their ill-treatment, thousands of my compatriots, 
also residing in Turkish lands and deprived of all property, wander from 
place to place and receive meager assistance, as the Armenian nation, due to 
its limited means, is unable to provide sufficient help to alleviate the lot of 
its sorrowful subjects. 8o 
Understandably, the largest and most consistent donations from non-
Russian sources came from the Greek communities in Russia. Their active 
participation in the relief drives represented a natural extension of their 
broad support for the Greek national movement. Prior to 1821, the Greeks 
of Russia made significant contributions to Greek education and enlighten-
ment, both in Russia and the Greek world. 81 Upon news of Ypsilantis's 
revolt in the Danubian Principalities, Greeks in Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
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Taganrog, Kishinev, and Odessa formed volunteer units and organized 
shipments of arms and supplies to insurgent forces. 82 After the defeat of 
Ypsilantis's forces, Russian-based Greeks concentrated on raising relief 
funds. Especially active in this early phase of relief assistance was the 
Greek Philanthropic Society of Odessa, organized in August 1821, which 
collected roughly one million rubles and rendered food and shelter to 
nearly 300 indigent Greek sailors. Although tolerated by local government 
authorities in southern Russia, the Greek Philanthropic Society was re-
garded by Alexander I as a screen for political and insurgent-related activ-
ity and was thus outlawed in January 1822Y 
Within this context, therefore, generous Greek donations to Golitsyn's 
two relief drives were hardly surprising.84 A Greek in Moscow, D. Mimis, 
donated fifty furs to provide winter hats for refugees in Odessa and Bess-
arabia; while in St. Petersburg, local Greek clergymen selected I. Dombo-
lis, E. Kallergis, and D. Pistolis to organize the collection of ransom 
funds. 85 In most cases, Greek support took the form of sizable donations 
from individuals, many of whom were merchants and active promoters of 
Greek nationalistic activity in Russia and the Greek world, such as Z. Zosi-
mas of Moscow (2,000 r.); N. Patsimadis of Moscow (2,000 r.); A. Notaras 
of Moscow (1,000 r.); M. Rizaros of Nezhin (1,000 r.); D. Inglezis of 
Odessa (1,000 r.); G. Chrisarios of Odessa (720 r.); and G. Matsos of Mos-
cow (100 r.).86 A. Gorgolis of Moscow, who contributed 6,000 rubles in 
relief assistance, echoed the views of Russia's Greek communities as a 
whole when he wrote to Golitsyn that he was inspired "by love of human-
ity, patriotism, and an obligation to help impoverished and unfortunate 
relatives and compatriots," specifically those from his native Yannina, 
"where they suffer, are without food, shelter, and clothes, and are far 
removed from the help of pious Russians. "87 
Some Greeks claimed their contributions were limited as a result of 
the decline in Russia's Black Sea trade. M. Psalidas, who collected 185 
rubles, bemoaned his meager 5 ruble donation: "Because of the sad events 
in our fatherland, which caused a complete fall in my trade activity, I have 
been placed in extreme straits and thus could not be more helpful to my 
compatriots in alleviating their plight. "88 In like manner, N. Patsimadis 
attributed his small collection (1,620 r.) from Moscow Greeks to the de-
cline in trade revenues, which compelled several who were "generally 
known for their compassion" to restrict their donations. 89 
Alexandros Stourdzas and his sister R. Stourdza-Edling took a lively 
interest in Greek affairs and helped refugees from Constantinople and the 
Danubian Principalities. As mentioned, Stourdza-Edling was responsible 
for informing Empress Elizaveta Alekseevna of the subscription drive for 
refugees. In order to help the poor and needy, both Greek and Russian, 
Stourdza-Edling built schools, churches, a hospital, and an orphanage on 
her estate in Bessarabia. She and her brother donated generously to both 
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relief drives and interceded personally on their compatriots' behalf when-
ever they could. 90 
For the period 1821-1830, Russian philorthodox assistance from 
government and military circles, various sosloviia, and non-Russian ele-
ments extended into the millions of rubles. More significant than the final 
amount is that donations continued throughout the nine years. While 
contributions were more forthcoming from 1821 to 1824, when the Greek 
cause had the largest and most enthusiastic public backing in Russia, siz-
able amounts of relief aid were raised in the last three years of the revolt. 
In June 1827, for example, Archimandrite Polikarp of Novospasskii Mon-
astery in Moscow collected 2,900 rubles; Metropolitan Serafim of Peters-
burg and Novgorod 3,500 rubles; and Metropolitan Evgenii of Kiev 2,500 
rubles. 91 In 1829, the eparchies of Kostroma, Kaluga, and Pskov raised 
20,000 rubles and the Petersburg Religious Consistory 4,300 rubles. 92 Also 
in 1829, Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow received 8,800 rubles in exchange 
for selling two local merchants ecclesiastical treasures which had originally 
been donated by several churches in his eparchy on behalf of Greek cap-
tives. 93 The continuity and longevity of philorthodox assistance, in addi-
tion to casting light on the widespread appeal of the Greek issue in Russian 
society, reveal that P. S. Meshcherskii and Admiral A. S. Shishkov, Golit-
syn's successors after 1824, continued to support Greek relief. The same 
can also be said of Alexander's successor, Nicholas I. 
The Russian government did more than just organize and encourage 
the collection of relief support. This was only half the battle. Efforts had 
to be made to see that relief aid was properly administered and distributed. 
Upon the tsar's approval, Golitsyn created local mechanisms in Odessa and 
Kishinev designed to do just that. Specifically, Golitsyn instructed Gover-
nors-General Inzov and Langeron to establish relief assistance committees 
in Bessarabia and Odessa to supervise distribution of Greek relief funds. It 
would appear that, based on the archives of the Holy Synod which were 
examined, more positive results were forthcoming from the attempt to 
assist refugees than the attempt to ransom Greek slaves. 
Our knowledge of the ransom procedure is fragmentary at best. Brit-
ish and French diplomatic records indicate that efforts were made to 
ransom Greek captives. Francis Werry, British Consul in Smyrna, wrote 
to the Levant Company (May 1822) that, although local authorities 
prohibited the sale of slaves to Christians, "many are redeemed by general 
subscription." In a subsequent note to the Levant Company (June 1822), 
Werry mentioned the European diplomatic community's intercession on 
behalf of Greek slaves: "In these severe moments, everyone is called on to 
assist in redeeming the poor children who are continuously paraded 
through . . . the streets for that purpose." Werry noted that many fe-
males and children were held captive in Smyrna, where they were "ex-
posed to sale - or redemption. "94 
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The French ambassador to the Porte, M. de Latour Maubourg, in-
formed the French foreign minister (May 1822) of his intention to open a 
subscription drive among Frenchmen in Constantinople for the purpose of 
redeeming Chios' enslaved Greek Catholics. Funds would be handled by 
the French consul, while Catholic religious authorities would be in charge 
of making arrangements for the exchange. 9s British and French documents 
demonstrate, in a general way, the concern which the Chios massacre 
aroused in the Western diplomatic circles of Constantinople and Smyrna. 
Further exploration of Western diplomatic and travel reports might en-
large our knowledge of the results of such efforts to ransom Greek slaves. 
Our picture of the distribution of Russian ransom money and the role 
played by Russian consular officials is shrouded with uncertainties. In a 
letter to Golitsyn (November 1822), Oikonomos underscored the need to 
minimize as much as possible the fanfare and publicity surrounding the 
subscription drive for captives. It would be advisable, he wrote, if the 
Turkish government did not catch wind of this "new deed of Russian 
benevolence." On the crucial matter of redeeming the slaves, Oikonomos 
suggested that donations be placed in the hands of a secret committee in 
Odessa, comprised of two or three prudent and reliable individuals, such 
as A. Stourdzas and the merchant D. Inglezis. The committee would be in 
charge of making arrangements for ransoming captives. The letter, which 
apparently went unanswered by Golitsyn, raises more questions than it 
answers. Most important, Oikonomos did not mention how the secret 
committee was to go about arranging its transactions. 96 
A more detailed but still incomplete picture of the ransom procedure 
emerges from the report of Governor-General of Bessarabia General Inzov 
to Minister of Interior Kochubei (30 July 1823). A committee in Kishinev 
comprised of local clerics was to send ransom donations to prominent and 
trustworthy Greek merchants in Odessa. Upon receiving the money, the 
merchants would forward it to commercial agents in the Ottoman Empire, 
with instructions to use the funds to ransom Greek slaves. If and when the 
instructions were carried out successfully, according to Inzov's report, the 
merchants of Odessa who had originally received the money would inform 
the Kishinev committee of the results, specifically the number of Greeks 
ransomed and the price paid for each one. The Kishinev committee would 
then report the results to the governor-general of Bessarabia and to Golit-
syn. 97 
If such was the actual procedure, it is safe to assume that Russian 
consular officials played a role of some sort. This seems all the more likely 
in view of the fact that since 1774, Russian consuls and vice-consuls in the 
Near East, most of whom were of Greek descent, had close ties with the 
sultan's Greek subjects and attempted to alleviate their plight whenever 
possible. Concrete and detailed information on Russian attempts to ran-
som Greek captives might be forthcoming from a further investigation of 
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archival materials of the Holy Synod. A more complete picture of this 
question might also emerge from an examination of the archival collections 
of the Russian Foreign Ministry and regional archives in Odessa and 
Kishinev. 
There exists an anonymous published account describing the fate of 
three young Chiots who were ransomed in Constantinople and ended up 
in Kazan.'98 Appearing in Kazanskii vestnik (Kazan Messenger) (1823), a 
journal which was under the supervision of a special editorial board of 
Kazan University, the brief article mentions that Konstantinos Vostano-
glou, a Greek who spoke Turkish, was in Constantinople when many 
Chiot captives were brought to the local slave market. Moved by the miser-
able lot of two young Chiots who had fallen into the hands of an Arab from 
Aleppo, Vostanoglou decided to ransom them. The Arab, who had unsuc-
cessfully tried all means to convert the youths to Islam, agreed to the sale. 
The arrangements were made by a friend of Vostanoglou, a Greek believer 
who outwardly professed Islam. When Vostanoglou discovered that the 
Arab owned a third Chiot slave, he ransomed all three. The fee was set at 
6,500 piastres for the three youths - M. Tofras, 12, S. Pouladas, 12, and 
P. Kliamouris, 11. The parents of all three had perished during the Chios 
massacre. 
Vostanoglou initially placed the redeemed captives in a Greek school 
in Constantinople. But due to the climate of religious frenzy and the unrul-
iness of the janissaries, he made provisions to send them to Russia. After 
great difficulty, the nature of which was not discussed in the article, Vosta-
noglou arrived in Odessa (1823) with the three Chiots. He expected that 
"compassionate souls" would be found to give the youths a decent upbring-
ing and education, something which Vostanoglou was unable to do himself 
after the ransom and travel expenses. The curator of the Kazan Educa-
tional District, Mikhail L. Magnitskii, one of the most reactionary civil 
servants in the final years of the Alexandrine era, interceded on behalf of 
the Chiots and sought Golitsyn's permission to place them in the Kazan 
Gymnasium at government expense. Golitsyn approved the request and 
instructed Governor-General of New Russia, M. S. Vorontsov to provide 
necessary funds for travel expenses and clothes for the Chiot orphans. 99 
The article in Kazanskii vestnik concluded with the observation that the 
unexpected arrival of the "three young believers" was a reward for the 
large donations and generosity which the Kazan Educational District had 
rendered on behalf of the Chiots in captivity. 100 
This brief article, while offering a specific example of redemption, 
raises several questions. Above all, how did Vostanoglou and the Chiots 
make their way to Odessa? How, if at all, did Russian diplomatic officials 
assist Vostanoglou? While generalizations are difficult based on this one 
piece of evidence, it would seem that individual initiative and Christian 
charity played a major factor in the ransom procedure. 
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One gets a clearer and more detailed picture of the subscription drive 
for Greek refugees, particularly the activity of the relief committee estab-
lished in Odessa. The Relief Assistance Committee was initially headed by 
Metropolitan Kiril of Silistria and included two Phanariot Greeks, G. 
Handjeri and N. SoutsOS. 10 1 This particular committee was immediately 
superseded by another appointed by Langeron. Because of poor health, 
Metropolitan Kiril was replaced by M. la. Minchaki, a Russian diplomatic 
official who had served in Constantinople and had extensive contacts with 
the Greek communities in southern Russia. More significant was Lang-
eron's decision to broaden the social base of the original committee by 
appointing merchants from Odessa and Constantinople - D. Inglezis, A. 
Mavros, D. Schinas, and S. Kosmandas. They all had commercial dealings 
with a large cross-section of Greek society. They also, according to Lang-
eron, were probably more aware than aristocratic Phanariots of the true 
state of indigent Greeks from middle and lower social groups who were in 
the greatest need of assistance. The Relief Assistance Committee of Odessa 
received donations either from Golitsyn, who in most cases channeled 
them through the Ministry of Finance, or directly from eparchy and 
gubernii authorities. Upon receipt, the relief funds were to be deposited in 
the Odessa Exchange Bank. Langeron entrusted the merchant D. Inglezis 
with the duty of treasurer; it was his function to keep accurate records of 
the committee's revenues and expenditures, copies of which were to be sent 
to Golitsyn on a regular basis. 102 
The committee's chief task consisted of distributing emergency assis-
tance to individuals and families from middle and lower social groups, that 
is, "traders, townsmen, masters, craftsmen, and sailors."103 Langeron took 
it upon himself to provide help to Phanariot Greeks. Before distribution, 
the committee was required to assess the actual needs of each individual 
or family and determine the amount of emergency support each should re-
ceive. Upon arrival in Odessa, the refugees were placed in two-week 
quarantine, during which period the committee divided them into three 
broad groupings or categories based on social status and occupation: 
merchants and others of "significant standing;" artisans, peddlers, and 
shopkeepers; and workers and sailors. Distribution of relief aid corre-
sponded roughly to an individual's or a family's social classification. The 
higher the grouping, the larger the monthly sum issued by the committee. 
For example, a single person from the first social grouping received 2.5 
rubles a month, while a single person from the second and third categories 
received 1.5 rubles and 60 kopeks respectively. Similarly, a family from the 
first, second, and third groupings received 5, 3.5, and 2.75 rubles respec-
tively.104 In addition to one's social classification, distribution of relief aid 
was determined by the amount of donations at the committee's disposal. 
Depending on the latter, relief help was to be issued either monthly or 
every two months. 
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The detailed financial records of the Odessa Relief Assistance Com-
mittee reveal the concrete support it rendered to refugees. 105 To take one 
six-month period, January-June 1824, the committee distributed 81,760 
rubles, most of which went to widows, orphans, the needy, and patients 
at Odessa City Hospital who were in need of medical care. The committee 
also provided funds and other assistance to 214 Greeks expressing interest 
to return to the Greek world. 106 
In line with traditional patterns of Greek migration to Russia since 
1453, Greek clergymen were treated with extreme generosity by both 
government authorities and the Odessa and Kishinev relief committees. 
Indeed, of all the refugees, Greek clerics received the largest and most 
consistent monthly financial support, ranging from 45-75 rubles for 
monks, priests, and deacons; 150 rubles for archimandrites, bishops, and 
archbishops; to 170 rubles for metropolitans. 107 In February 1822, Arch-
bishop Dmitrii of Kishinev, head of the local relief assistance committee, 
distributed 25,000 rubles to 441 Greek clergymen from Moldavia-metro-
politans, archimandrites, monks, nuns, priests, and deacons. The Odessa 
and Kishinev committees, at Golitsyn's request, also tried to place Greek 
clergymen in Greek monasteries in Taganrog, Kiev, and Moscow. 108 While 
most remained in Russia for at least the duration of the revolt, some clergy-
men expressed a desire to return to the Greek East as soon as possible. For 
example, in January 1826, the monk Chrysanthos received 300 rubles 
before venturing to return to Mt. Athos.109 
On many occasions, high-placed Greeks in Russian service, such as, 
Kapodistrias before his resignation (August 1822) and Stourdzas, inter-
ceded on behalf of Greek families to either Golitsyn or the relief assistance 
committees. One such example occurred in July 1822, when Kapodistrias 
informed Golitsyn that Anton Isaii, a Smyrna-born Greek, and his family 
were in need of emergency relief support. Golitsyn fulfilled the request, 
reporting to Kapodistrias that "at your behest I gave A. Isaii 1,000 rubles 
from the sums collected to assist Greeks."l1O A Phanariot Greek, Anastasii 
Kalliardji, benefited from Stourdzas' intercession on his behalf. In view of 
Kalliardjis' significant losses of property in Bucharest and Constantinople 
and the martyrdom of his brother, who had been archbishop of Ephesus 
before meeting the same fate as Patriarch Gregorios, Golitsyn instructed 
Governor-General Inzov to give Kalliardjis and his family 3,200 rubles in 
addition to an annual pension of 400 rubles. ll1 
The successors of Inzov and Langeron showed contined support of 
and com'mitment to the relief endeavors. They rendered as much help as 
possible to facilitate the distribution of relief aid to indigent refugees. 
Governor-General of New Russia Vorontsov, for example, proposed to 
Golitsyn that a captured supply of Greek arms be sold to Don Cossacks, 
in exchange for which the money could be used to help "unfortunate Greek 
refugees." Upon the approval of the tsar and Golitsyn, Vorontsov carried 
out his project and raised 875 rubles. 103 
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The Russian government's sponsorship of Greek relief assistance was 
motivated by pragmatic in addition to humanitarian concerns. With the 
influx of refugees, officials recognized the need to supply not only tempo-
rary emergency aid but also productive employment. If realized, this 
would facilitate the settlement and economic-commercial development of 
southern Russia -long an objective of tsarist policy which brought the 
Russian and Greek worlds closer together in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. 
One such attempt at Greek settlement was the proposal of Major-
General Count V. V. Orlov-Denisov to settle one hundred Greeks on his 
estate near the Sea of Azov. Along with food, shelter, and medical care, 
Orlov-Denisov would provide full-time labor in fishing-related industries. 
The Odessa relief committee, which published the proposal in Greek and 
posted it throughout the city, expressed reservations about the potential 
success of the project. In its reply to Golitsyn and Langeron, the committee 
stated that the bulk of refugees - sailors, sea-captains, peddlers, small-
time merchants, and shopkeepers - did not consider themselves permanent 
residents in Russia. Reluctant to resettle in areas when their skills might be 
in demand, they sought instead to stay as close as possible to the southern 
border in the hope of returning to Greek lands once hostilities ended. More 
crucial, the committee asserted, it would be difficult for predominantly 
urbanized and maritime Greeks to grow accustomed to rural life. 113 To the 
committee's surprise, sixty-three Greeks, most of them sailors, accepted the 
proposal on condition that the committee supply proper clothing and 
travel expenses. In line with Golitsyn's instructions, the committee com-
plied, offering clothes, shoes, and 40 rubles to each would-be settler on 
Orlov-Denisov's estate. 104. 
The tsar himself, fully aware of the refugees' labor potential, re-
quested the Odessa committee to find employment for the newcomers. 
Foreign Minister Nesselrode relayed Alexander's instructions in a despatch 
on June 1822 to Governor-General Langeron. It opened by expressing 
gratitude for the committee's 'justice, mercy, and good sense" in distribut-
ing relief funds. But, the despatch emphasized, more substantial measures 
were needed to render help to the refugees, all the more so as relief dona-
tions might be scarce or depleted in the future. Without work and unable 
to return to Greek lands, most refugees were thus forced to remain in 
Russia for at least the duration of the revolt. Along with "shelter and care 
rendered from the heart of the Russian tsar," steps were to be taken to put 
the refugees to work. The committee was to divide the most indigent 
Greeks into categories designated by their craft and occupation. It was also 
to contact civilian and military governors of Bessarabia, Georgia, Podolsk, 
the Crimea, and the Ukraine in order to ascertain the specific labor needs 
of each region, according to which the refugees would then be resettled. 
Greek sailors who did not enter Russian naval service were to be stationed 
in Nikolaev or other naval ports in New Russia. 
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The tsar requested the committee to rely on its own resources in ful-
filling the proposal. In the event of scarce funds, the committee would be 
allowed to borrow from local government authorities or the Petersburg 
treasury. But, the despatch underscored, the committee should try by all 
means to manage without government assistance and refrain from letting 
Greeks know of the tsar's readiness to offer financial support if need be. 
Above all, the committee was to convince refugees that only by their own 
efforts could they become self-supporting and attain proper and prolonged 
sustenance while in Russia. If successfully carried out, the despatch con-
cluded, the tsar's proposal would not only provide support to impoverished 
Greeks but hasten the colonization and further development of southern 
lands.l1S 
Similar to its lukewarm response to Orlov-Denisov's proposal, the 
relief committee of Odessa questioned the feasibility of the tsarist initia-
tive. The main obstacle, it noted in its reply to Nesselrode, was that most 
refugees had abandoned homes and property as a result of Turkish repris-
als and fully intended to return to the Greek world as soon as possible. The 
committee also asserted that, in addition to their reluctance to resettle, 
few, if any, Greek arrivals were viniculturists or skilled artisans (tailors, 
shoemakers, furriers), both of which occupations were in demand in south-
ern regions. The potential value of the refugees' labor, the commmittee 
noted, was reduced by their "tendency to work in the Asiatic manner." As 
for Greek sailors, most demonstrated a desire to return home rather then 
enter Russian naval service. They hoped to follow in the footsteps of 300 
Greek sailors who, with partial funding from the committee, had recently 
set out for the Greek world via Brod and Trieste. The committee's reply 
concluded with a pledge to assist all refugees, including widows, orphans, 
the sick and needy; those desiring to return home; and, regardless of the 
obstacles to the tsarist proposal, those willing to resettle in southern 
Russia. 116 
Greek relief assistance, one of several philanthropic endeavors during 
Alexander's reign, was in accordance with the currents of pietism and 
Christian universalism which helped shaped the ethos of the final decade 
of the Alexandrine era. Yet even as a simple act of Christian charity, phil-
orthodox aid to coreligionists ran counter to Alexander's, and after him 
Nicholas', longing for social-political stability, dread of national indepen-
dence movements, and commitment to legitimacy. The apparent contra-
diction of tsarist support for the Greek insurrection is best explained by the 
political gains to be reaped. In addition to the development of southern 
Russia, Greek relief assistance was motivated by the prospect of political 
and diplomatic influence in an independent Greek state. Philorthodox 
relief thus became a means not only to bolster Russia's traditional image 
as protector of Orthodoxy but to curry favor with the Greeks. Indeed, it 
was not the first, neither would it be the last, occasion that humanitarian 
Russian Relief during the Greek War of Independence 55 
support to a Balkan neighbor carried potential political capital. Another 
possible pragmatic concern of the regime was to match, if not surpass, the 
generous philhellenic support raised in Western Europe. 
Along with rendering moral and material help to insurgent Greece, 
government-sponsored relief drives kept the Greek issue before the public 
eye throughout the 1820s. The subscription campaigns represent a rare 
example of Russian government and society working together in common 
cause. The government created an organized and well-defined structure 
for the expression of Grecophile sentiment, with the result that public 
enthusiasm for the Greek cause was channeled by the government into 
effective relief assistance. That all sectors of society contributed would 
seem to indicate that popular spontaneity, rather than compulsion from 
local religious and secular authorities, was the chief impulse behind relief 
donations. The groundswell of public support demonstrates the wide-
spread appeal of the Greek cause and fully substantiates the statement 
made by the nineteenth-century Russian historian Dmitrii Bukharov: "Up 
until that time, not one popular [narodnoe] revolt, no matter where it took 
place, aroused as much general attention and intense sympathy as the 
revolt of the Greeks."1l7 
Finally, the public's sizable contributions clearly indicate that a wide 
cross section of society continued to feel a close affinity with Greek subjects 
of the Orthodox East. While the bulk of philorthodox relief came from 
government officials, clergymen, and the nobility, the records of the Holy 
Synod reveal that aid was also forthcoming from the district and parish 
level, where, perhaps more so than elsewhere in Russian society, the Greek 
cause was seen as essentially a religious issue. In addition to the traditional 
bonds of religion and Orthodox culture, Russian literary circles increas-
ingly viewed the Greeks through the prism of their awakening interest in 
the classical heritage. For Russian classical scholars and romanticist poets, 
the modern Greeks were not only coreligionists but the descendants of their 
renowned classical forebears. 
NOTES 
1. The following overview of Russian philhellenism is based on this author's "Russian 
Cultural Response to the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830)," Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Minnesota, 1982. 
2. See the detailed bibliography of Loukia Droulia, Philhellenisme. Ouvrages inspires 
par la guerre de l'independance grecque (1821-1833) (Athens, 1974), which, however, 
makes no reference to Russian philhellenism. 
3. For a review of Western and Russian works on Russian philhellenism see this 
author's dissertation. A few of the more significant Soviet works on the subject deserve men-
tion. Much of Soviet scholarship has focused on the Greek revolt's diplomatic repercussions 
on the European balance of power and on Russia's Eastern policy. This literature is sum-
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marized in A. L. Narochnitskii, "Grecheskoe natsional"no-osvoboditel"noe dvizhenie i Ros-
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(Athens, 1981). The works of Grigorii L. Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii (Moscow, 
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v XV-XVII vv.,: Grecheskie rukopisi v Rossii (Moscow, 1977); and William Medlin and 
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sey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981), pp. 111-36. 
5. Gregorios's official declaration of excommunication against Ypsilantis and his fol-
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ments, Richard Clogg (ed.) (London, 1976), pp. 203-6. 
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essays in Symposium. L'epoque phanariote. A la memoire de Cleobule Tsourkas (Thessa-
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